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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

1-!ARRY J.

CHRISTIA.~SEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

vs.
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, and
JOHN G. MILLER,

Case No. 17250

Defendant-Respondent.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered after jury trial held
in the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor presiding,
(judgment was rendered after a jury trial beginning on the 30th day of May,
1980, and continuing through the 5th day of June, 1980), and from the subsequent denial bv the Court of Plaintiff's Motions for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and for a new trial.

Appellant also appeals from the order deny-

ing Plaintiff's Motion to amend the complaint signed by the Honorable Bryant H.
Croft on January 23, 1980.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment and an order granting a
new trial to the Plaintiff, and an order allowing the complaint to be amended
to add new Defendants and seek punitive damages.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

The Court's refusal to give Plaintiff's requested instructions

and the giving of instructions objected to by the Plaintiff deny to Plaintiff
the right to a fair trial.
2.

The Plaintiff was denied a fair

tr~al

by the failure of the
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Defendant John G. Miller to appear at trial and the Plaintiff should have
granted judgment against the Defendant John G. z!iller as pra:1ed.
3.

The failure and refusal of the Court to instruct the jury

the consequences of their apportiornnent of negligence denied to Plaintiff
right to a fair trial.
4.

The jury's verdict was a result of sympathy, bias, prejudi

•nd ,2ssion and was contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.
S.

The Court's refusal to grant Plaintiff's }lotion to amend

Complaint to assert wilful and wanton negligence denied Plaintiff a fair
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This case arose out of a collision between a passenger automoc
and a Utah Transit Authority bus which occurred on 700 East at 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah, on January 17, 1978, at approximately 6:30 p.rn.

The

lowing facts are uncontroverted in the record and corroborated by the test
of the witnesses.

It should be noted that where the testimony of the Defe

John G. Miller is cited, references are to the deposition of John G. Mille
was read into the record at trial and which is an exhibit on appeal

Refer

to the testimony of John G. Miller given at trial will be to his depositic
The collision which is the subject of this lawsuit occurred or.
January 17, 1978, at approximately 6:30 p.m.
tiff was driving a 1971 Ford Mustang coupe.

See Record, pp. 354-56.
See Record, p. 53.

The

The Defer.

John G. Miller was an employee of and driving a bus for the Utah Transit J
ority.

Utah Transit Authority conceded at trial that ~!r. Miller was emplc

by them and operating the bus as their employee.

Defendant Utah Transit·"

ority stipulated at trial that any judgment against Mr. ~liller could be e:

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

against Gtah Transit Authority because ot the employer-employee relationship.
Poth vehicles '"'ere traveling Southbound on 700 East and approaching 2100 South
in Salt Lake City.

See Tr. pp. 354, 292.

The Plaintiff Mr. Christiansen testi-

fied that as he approached 2100 South, he signalled and turned into the righthand lane.

As he approached 2100 South, another Utah Transit Authority bus

was stopped in the righthand lane waiting for a red light and Mr. Christiansen
stopped approximately 10 feet behind the first bus.

Tr. p. 355.

Mr. Miller testified that as his bus approached 2100 South, the Mustang driven by the Plaintiff pulled into his lane, it may or may not have been
signaling, he did not recall, and the Mustang then stopped behind the first
bus.

Mr. Miller applied the brakes on his bus, but was unable to stop the bus

prior to its impact with the Plaintiff's vehicle.

See Tr. pp. 291-293.

The

version of the accident most favorable to the Defendant is that given by Mr.
Miller in his deposition.

Mr. Miller's version of the accident is as follows:

"The bus was in the lane traveling Southbound on 7th East in the righthand lane
with another bus ahead of him."

See Tr. pp. 291-2.

As Defendant Miller's bus

approached the light at 21st South, which light was red, a bus was stopped to
wait for the light.

As Mr. Miller approached the intersection, the Mustang

pulled in front, drove for a few seconds and stopped.
4-7.

See Tr. p. 292, lines

Mr. Miller testified that the Mustang was stopped at the time his bus

hit him and that the Mustang had been stopped one or two seconds prior to the
impact.

Tr. p. 292, lines 17-20.

Mr. Miller further testified that the stop

made by the Mustang was not a panic stop or a sliding stop, but just a quick
stop.

Tr. pp, 292-93.

Mr. Miller testified that: the Mustang did not skid his

brakes, did not slide his wheels, but merely made what Mr. Miller characterized
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as

a quick stop.

Tr. p. 293.

Mr. Hiller further testified that the Pla

had come to a complete stop and released his brakes so that the brake lig
were off at the time of the collision.

See Tr. pp· 29 3-94.

Mr. Miller t-

fied that the vehicle he was operating had "spongy" brakes and that the b:
were not operating efficiently.

Tr. pp. 294-95.

Mr. Miller testified t~

he struck the Mustang with enough impact to knock it forward 30-40 feet,
Tr. p. 295, but that he did not knock him forward far enough to strike th,
behind which the Plaintiff was stopped foe: the red light.

Mr. Miller tes:

that the accident could have been prevented if his brakes on the bus had
100~

effective.

See Tr. p. 302, lines 17-24.

The deposition testimony of Mr. Miller appears to conflict wi:
written statement he gave to his company at the time of the accident.

(R,

pp. 48-49) in that when he describes the accident in detail (Record, p. ":
states that a Mustang stopped abruptly, he applied brakes and was unable·
There is no mention of the Mustang pulling into his lane to create a haza:
Mr. Miller testified that he had reported to the company on t:
day of the accident that the brakes were very spongy and that the bus had
ceived a road call earlier in the day.

See Record, p.

303, lines 1-8.

r

further indicates that Mr. Miller notified the sign out man at the time t'
the bus left the garage, that the brakes were spongy.

24-25; p. 304, lines 4-12.

See Record, p. 303.

Mr. Miller testified by deposition that at th•

the Mustang pulled into his lane of traffic, i t was 25-30 feet in front o'
bus.

Record, p. 308, at lines 408.

Mr. Miller testified that the bus anc

Mustang traveled in the same lane of traffic for approximately 400 feet p:
to the time the accident occurred.

Tr. p. 308 at lines 22-25.

Mr. Miller

tified that he began gentle braking at the time the )~stang came into his
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and that the iiustang tra·1eled in his lane two or three seconds before it started
to apply its brakes.
t-

See Tr. p. 309.

Mr. Miller testified that during the

two to three seconds that he traveled in the Southbound lane prior to the Mustang beginning its braking maneuver, he was braking gently but did nothing to
increase the distance between the iiustang and the bus.
lines 4-19.

See Record, p. 309 at

During the whole time that the Mustang was in his lane, Mr. Miller

was apparently attempting to slow the bus through gentle braking.
s:

pp. 309-311.

See Record,

Mr. Miller testified that during the two or three seconds that he

estimated the Mustang was in his lane before he started to brake, he had not
done anything to increase the actual distance between his bus and the Mustang,
·i:

See Record, p. 312, lines 14-22, yet in the accident report he gave the company,
he blamed the bad brakes for the accident.

4:

Mr. Miller testified that at the time of the collision, the road
was wet.

See Record, p. 313, lines 22-23.

Mr. Miller watched the Mustang as

a:

it stopped and even though the road was wet, the Mustang did not slide or fish-

t:

tail as it stopped, but just stopped in a Stright line without skidding.

.d

Tr. p. 314 at lines 2-ll.

r:

brakes had been up to par, he would have been unable to stop without colliding

t'

with the Mustang.

I].

See

Mr. Miller testified that in his opinion, if the

See Record, p. 302 at lines 17-24.

The testimony of Mr. Miller in his deposition differs significantly from his written statement made immediately after the accident.

See Record,

o'

pp. 48-49, 283-320.

nc

no mention of the '!ustang pulling into his lane.

p:

statement that bad brakes on the bus caused the accident.

er

to appear at trial, Plaintiff was precluded from cross examination on this

In the accident report, Record pp. 48-49, Mr. Miller makes
Mr. Miller indicates in his
Due to his failure

S

-5-
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significant change in his description of the events of the collision.
The testimony of Mr. Christiansen was that he pulled into the
hand lane of travel a good one-half block North of 21st South, came to a s
behind a bus stopped for the red light at 21st South, and that he was park
behind the first bus waiting for the light to change when he noticed a sec
bus approaching from the rear in his rear view mirror.
which subsequently collided with his vehicle.

It was this second

See Record, pp. 355-56.

The Plaintiff-Appellant received numerous injuries as a result
the collision referred to above which injuries were corroborated by the te·
mony of Dr. Reams, Dr. Wright, Dr. Ruoff, Dr. Nelson and Dr. Horne.

Mr. C

tiansen himself testified regarding the pain and suffering he has e.xperien
as a result of the injuries received in the collision.

Mr. Christiansen f

testified that as a result of the injuries and disabilities sustained by h
in the collision, he had lost income and was damaged by being unable to wo
certain periods of time.

The injuries of Mr. Christiansen were corroborat

by testimony from his mother, Ruth Christiansen, as well as by the testimo·
of the doctors who appeared and testified on his behalf.

Dr. Horne testif

that as a result of the injuries sustained in the collision, Nr. Christiallhad certain permanent disabilities.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS AND THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTIONS
OBJECTED TO BY THE PLAINTIFF DENY TO PLAINTIFF
THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.
The trial Court, over the objection of the Plaintiff, gave fou

instructions requested by the Defendant numbered 21, 22, 23 and 25 of the
instructions, Record at pp. 158-161, and refused to give Plaintiff's reque·

-6-
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instruction nu. 3 (Record at p. 115).

The Court also refused to give an instruc-

tion requested h·• the Plaintiff relating to the legal affect of the apportionment of negligence by the jury.

The Court's refusal to give that particular

instruction will be discussed at Point III in the brief.

The Plaintiff proper-

ly took exception to the refusal to the Court to give its instruction no. 8 and
to the giving of instructions no. 21, 22, 23 and 24 given by the Court and requested by Defendants.

See Record, pp. 728-730.

The Plaintiff further objected

to the restriction on closing argument imposed by the Court wherein the Plaintiff
was limited to 30 minutes for its closing argument.

See Record, p. 730.

The Court refused to give Plaintiff's requested instruction no. 8
which would have instructed the jury as follows:
If you should find that it was within the power of the
parties to produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence than that which was offered on a material point,
you may view with distrust any weaker and less satisfactory evidence actually offered by him on that point,
unless such failure is satisfactorily explained.
The Defendants failed to produce at trial the Defendant John Miller, the supervisor who signed out the bus to John Miller on the date of the accident, and
the mechanic who repaired the brakes on the bus after the collision occurred.
The Defendants never at any time during the trial offered a satisfactory explanation as to why these three witnesses were not at the trial.

In fact, as to

the Defendant John Miller, the Plaintiff claims a particular prejudice in his
not being available to testify at trial which is discussed herein as Point II.
One of the critical contentions of the Plaintiff in the case "as that at the
time John

~-tiller

took the bus onto the road, he communicated to the sign-out

man that the bus had bad brakes and was told by the sign-out man to take the
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bus out anyway.

The Defendant's defense was based partiall'! on the fact

they claimed the bus did not have bad brakes when it was taken onto the

r

yet they failed to produce the witness who could have given an opinion ba
actual observation, the sign-out man, who Mr. Miller states drove the bus
the block before he took it out.

It was clearly within the power of the

Transit Authority to produce stronger evidence for their claim that the b
did not have bad brakes, in the person of the sign-out man, than was proc
at trial.
With respect to the particular mechanic that worked on the

br

of the nus, on two separate occasions the Plaintiff attempted to take his
sition, see Record at pp. 73, 77, and the Utah Transit Authority failed

~

occasions to produce the mechanic who worked on the brakes for deposition
Again at trial the Defendant Utah Transit Authority defended the Plaintif:
claim that the brakes were faulty by bringing in a supervisor who had not
on the particular brakes in question, who testified and gave opinions basi
a report filed by the mechanic who did the work in lieu of producing the
mechanic himself.

i

Thus, there was certainly a situation in the case whk

tified the instruction no. 8 requested by the Plaintiff.

By refusing to;

said instruction, the Plaintiff was precluded in his closing argument fro:
ing to the jury the fact that the less trustworthy evidence produced by t'
Defendant should be viewed in a more critical light than it was because o:
failure to produce the actual witnesses who had the firsthand knowledge o:
situation.

Thus, the Plaintiff respectfully urges that it was prejudicia:

for the Court to refuse to give requested instruction no. 8.
The Court, over the objection of Plaintiff, gave instruction:
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Record at p. 158.

The Plaintiff specifically objected to the last paragraph

of said instruction where it states that each driver was required to use due
care in the following respect, to-wit:
Not to suddenly stop or decrease his speed without
first ascertaining that he can do so with reasonable safety and, if other vehicles are to be affected
by such movement, not without first giving the appropriate signal to the driver to the rear that such
movement is to be made.
The Plaintiff objected to this particular paragraph of the instruction on the
grounds that it is misleading to the jury.

The evidence in the case is that

both the Plaintiff's vehicle and the bus which was following him were approacho:

ing

a red light at 2100 South on 7th East.

The evidence is uncontroverted

that Mr. Christiansen in his vehicle stopped behind a bus which had stopped
for a red light.

Both drivers were aware of the fact that as they approached

£:

the intersection that a stop would have to be made because the light was red.
Thus, to instruct the jury regarding a duty "not to stop or suddenly decrease

Si

his speed without first ascertaining that he can do so with reasonable safety,"
is inappropriate because the Plaintiff had a duty to stop for the red light and

c:

not signal other than his brake lights could arguably be required.
There is no evidence in the case that would necessitate the giving of

o:

the last paragraph of instruction no. 21.

The appropriate signal is given by

t'

the brake lights of the vehicle at such time as the Plaintiff puts his foot

o:

onto the brake pedal.

Because of the fact that the bus driver is charged with

o:

knowledge that the Mustang must stop at the red light, to give this instruction

a.

says to the jury that they could properly find the Plaintiff negligent for having stopped his vehicle behind a bus stopped for a red light when the stop that
he made was required by law.

Such instruction is misleading and prejudicial
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to the Plaintiff.
The Court gave, over the objection of Plaintiff, instruction·
22 (Record at p. 159) which states:
You are instructed that a person operating an automobile upon a public highway has an obligation to
keep a reasonable lookout to the rear, as well as
in all other directions, from which traffic may be
approaching in order to avoid danger to himself and
others and to operate his vehicle in a safe and
prudent manner in accordance with the conditions
then and there existing including those conditions
which might reasonably be anticipated. The duty of
one operating an automobile to keep a reasonable
lookout to the rear increases when the driver contemplates slowing or stopping his automobile upon
the traveled portion of the highway.
It is tne contention of the Plaintiff that this particular instruction is
erfluous and unduly emphasizes whatever duty there may have been on behal·
the Plaintiff to exercise care in the operation of his vehicle.

Assuming

an instruction is proper, instruction 21 has already stated that the Plai
has an obligation to use due care in operating his vehicle.

The collisio·

question was caused by the faulty brakes of the bus and by the fact that
bus driver did not keep a proper lookout and perhaps followed too close.
Mr. Christiansen was obligated to stop at the red light to avoid c:ollidfo
vehicles in front of him, instruction no. 22 unduly emphasizes a duty of
Christiansen to safely operate his vehicle when there is no evidence in r·
record that would support a violation of Mr. Christiansen of any duties h
have had to the following vehicle.
The Court, over the objection of the Plaintiff, gave instruct
no. 23, which the Plaintiff contends under the facts in the case is a mis
ment of the law under the circumstances of th is case.

In instruct ion 23,
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J'

Co11rt instructs th" i ur:; that a person shall not stop or suddenly decrease the
speed of the vehicle without giving an appropriate signal as provided by law,
when he has an opportunity to give such a signal.

It further states that the

s !.gna 1 to be given may be either made by the hand extended downward or by the
illumination of stop lights on the rear of the vehicle.

The Defendant speci-

fically objects to paragraph 3 of the said instruction on the grounds that it
tells the jury that the illumination of brake lights does not meet the statutory requirement of giving an appropriate signal and that it directly conflicts
with paragraph two which states that the giving of the mechanical signal by
the brake lights is acceptable.

The instruction is utterly confusing and would

allow the jury to adopt the view that Mr. Christiansen violated his duty to the
following vehicle by not giving an appropriate signal of his stop when, in fact,
there is no evidence in the case upon which the jury could properly base a finding that Mr. Christiansen did not properly signal his stop.

Even if we were

to assume that Mr. Christiansen did not signal the stop, a fact for which there
is no support in the evidence, the bus driver is charged with knowledge that
Mr. Christiansen is going to stop because of the fact that they are approaching an intersection governed by a red and green traffic signal which is red for
the Christiansen vehicle as well as the bus which is following him.

The Plain-

tiff respectfully submits that paragraph three of instruction no. 23 is a complete misstatement of the law as it relates to the facts in this case.

Plain-

tiff further contends that instruction 23 is repetitious and merely restates the
principles set forth in instructions 21 and 22 and places undue emphasis on
the duty to signal to following vehicles an intention to stop.

The law does

not require any further signal from a vehicle stopping at a red light than
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illumination of brake lights and indeed the red signal light is a signal
vehicles should stop.

Instruction 23 is prejudicial to the rights of t~

tiff, and is clearly responsible for causing the j urv to come to the verc
it did.

Clearly the instruction created a misunderstanding of a law rela

to the duty of the lead vehicle in a rear end collision situation and cac
the jury to assess more negligence to Plaintiff than would have been asse
if property instructions had been given
The Court, over the objection of the Plaintiff, gave instruct
no. 24 submitted by the Defendant (See Record, p. 161.)

This instructior.

whar is commonly known as the sudden peril instruction.

However, there i

evidence in the record from which the jury could properly find that the t
driver was confronted with what in the contemplation of the law is referr
a situation involving sudden peril.

Taken in the light most favorable tc

Defendant, it is uncontroverted that the bus driver followed the Christia
vehicle for some period of time prior to the time that the Christiansen •:
came to its stop.

The bus driver, even though he was aware of the fact:

the bus had bad brakes, and that the roads were slick from the rain, did
ing during the period of time he followed the Christiansen vehicle, to in
the distance between the Christiansen vehicle and the bus to a distance
he felt was a safe stopping distance.

t

The bus was approaching a red ligt

21st South as was the Christiansen vehicle.
vehicle would have to stop for the red light.

The bus knew that the Christ
The bus had failed to keep

mum safe stopping distance between himself and the Christiansen vehicle,
therefore, when the Christiansen vehicle stopped, the collision resulted
to the negligence of the bus driver, not because of any sudden peril in•
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the bus driver found himself.

The giving by the Court of instruction no. 24

was prejudicial to the Plaintiff in that it presented a distorted situation
to the jury and would allow them to find negligence on the Plaintiff or a lack
of negligence on the Defendant which did not relate to the actual evidence and
circumstances surrounding the collision as presented by the testimony.
This Honorable Court in the case of Solt v. Godfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210,
479 P.2d 474 (1972), reversed a case wherein a jury had found for the Defendant
in a personal injury situation and the trial court had refused to give an instruction relating to "to look is to see."

In reversing the case and holding

that the refusal to give such an instruction was prejudicial error, this Honarable Court stated
This instruction properly presented the Plaintiff's
theory of the case and should have been given, although it was refused . . . It appears to us that
the failure to give the requested instruction and
the giving of the one excepted to, amounted to errors which undoubtedly caused the jury to decide
as it did. We therefore, reverse and remand for a
new trial
In so

holding, the Utah Supreme Court followed the practice which appears to

be universal, that when the trial court refuses to give a proper instruction
relating to one of the major theories of the Plaintiff's case, or gives an instruction which is prejudicial to the Plaintiff's case, such is prejudicial
error entitling the Plaintiff to a new trial.l
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In Stephens v. Dulaney, supra, the New Mexico Supreme Court st_
A party is entitled to have the jury instructed
upon all correct legal theories of this case
which are pleaded and supported by the evidence,
and a failure by the trial court to so instruct
constitutes reversable error.
It would thus appear as set forth in Solt v. Godfrev, supra, that the fail
of the Court to give requested instructions, or the giving by the Court of
jectionable instructions, is prejudicial and shouid allow the party advers.
affected by the prejudicial error to have a new trial.
struction~

g~v~n

In this case, the_

by the Court over the objection of the Plaintiff clearly:

judiced the Flaintiff in that the net affect of said instructions was to

~

the jury that they might properly find the Plaintiff to be negligent becaw
of his failure to give some sort of signal of his stop other than the

ill~

ation of the brake lights prior to his stopping for the red light at 21st:
These instructions are clearly misleading to the jury.

The affect of thes<

instructions is that a person approaching a red light who puts on his brak<
thereby illuminating the brake lights, and stops for the red 1 ight, has so:
how violated his duty to signal his stop to following vehicles.

This inte:

tation of the statute which requires a party to signal his intention to st:
a red light is clearly wrong when applied to the facts in this case.

The:

pose of a statute requiring a signal for a stop is that a driver should no:
following vehicles that the vehicle intends to stop.

This is useful wheni

vehicle is stopping in a situation where the following vehicles could not•
expected to know of the impending stop of the signalling vehicle.

However,

to require more than the illumination of the brake lights when one stops fc
red light at a controlled intersection, is clearly not in the contemplatio:
of the protections afforded by the statute.

When the Court gave these ins:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, -14may contain errors.

requested by the Defendant, the jurv obviously became confused, especially with
the acguments of defense counsel in closing thal Mr. Christiansen had violated
his duty to signal to the following vehicle that he intended to stop and that
this was a basis for the jury finding him negligent in this collision.

The

Plaintiff respectfully urges the Court to find that the giving of these instructions was prejudicial error in that the driver of the bus was charged with knowledge that the Plaintiff's vehicle intended to stop behind the traffic that had
already stopped for the red light.

When one looks at the verdict of the jury,

to-wit, that the Plaintiff was 70% negligent and the Defendant 30% negligent,
the only conclusion that can be reached is that the instructions unduly emphasized the signal for stopping a vehicle and misdirected the jury.

Under a proper

set of instructions, reasonable minds could not differ on the fact that in the
circumstances of this case, the Plaintiff fulfilled his duty to signal a stop
and the Defendant was clearly more negligent than the Plaintiff.

II. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL
BY THE FAILURE OF DEFENDANT JOHN G. MILLER
TO APPEAR AT TRIAL AND THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD
HAVE BEEN GRANTED JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT JOHN G. MILLER AS PRAYED.
The Plaintiff's case at trial was severely prejudiced by the failure of the Defendant Miller to appear as a witness at the trial.

A discovery

deposition was taken from the Defendant John G. Miller on Tuesday, January 8,
1980, in preparation for the litigation.

At the time of the deposition, the

Plaintiff was assured hy counsel for Defendant that the Defendant John G. Miller
would be available to testify at the trial on the merits.

Because of these

assurances, the deposition taken by the Plaintiff's counsel was taken for discover:,' purposes only and not with any intention of being used as a testimonial
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deposition at trial.

In fact, there are several glaring discrepancies bet

the testimony given in the deposition and the statement made in writing b::
Defendant John G. Miller to Utah Transit Authority regarding the circumsta:
of the accident which was prepared within a day or two after the accident
pened.

It was the intention of Plaintiff to use these discrepancies to ill!:

the Defendant John G. Miller should he at trial give testimony similar to·
given in his deposition about the

circumstance~

surrounding the accident.

accident which is the basis of this lawsuit occurred on January 17, 1977 a:
6:35 p.t.

~'r.

;anuarv 18, 1977, John G. Miller filed with the Utah Transit

ority a two-page document entitled "Transportation Loss Report."
pp. 48-49.

See Reco:

In the Transportation Loss Report, John G. Miller states that:

weather was rainy, that the roadway was wet and then he gives a brief
of the accident as follows:
stop."
tail.

SUlllllli

"Bumped into rear of car just as I was leavin!

The next section of the Report asks him to describe the accident i:
In so doing, Mr. Miller states:
I had just stopped to pick up a passenger and was
pulling back into traffic when a yellow 1971 Ford
Mustang, License No. JED 320 stopped abruptly.
I
immediately applied brakes but was unable to stop
before running into the car at from 5-10 mph.
If
brakes had been 100%, I would have been
able to
stop. My foot was clear to the floor for a full
25 feet. Signed John G. Miller.

On page two of the Report, under the section entitled "Condition of Equipm<
Mr. Miller states "brakes very spongy and bus had received a road call ear:
in the day·"

He also states that he notified the sign-out man of the defe-

at 4:45 p.m.

Under the section entitled "Did you notice any equipment def

he hadmarked "yes."

See Record at p. 49.

In his deposition, Mr. ~!iller:
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the accident somewhat similar to the statement given in his report.

However,

he 'itates in answer to the question "Tell us how the accident occurred",
I had just pulled the bus over and dropped off a passenger
or picked one up. I was in the right lane and was remainin the right lane. There was another bus ahead of me. As
1 was nearing the light at 2100 South, which was red, the
other bus was stopped there waiting for it. I started to
stop, when this guy in the Mustang pulled in between us
and stopped, just stopped. I put the brakes to the floor.
It brought it down, but just didn't bring it down to a
stop before I hit him." Record at pp. 291-92.
In the version of the accident given in the deposition, Mr. Miller
states that the yellow Mustang pulled into his lane and stopped suddenly, while
he was stopping for the red light at 2100 South.

Yet in the original report

filed with the Transit Authority, Mr. Miller makes no mention of the Mustang
pulling into his lane in such a manner that it contributed to the accident.
In fact, he merely observes that the yellow Mustang is there and that he could
not stop his bus in time to avoid running into the rear.

At trial, counsel for

Defendant based their defense to a great degree on the idea that Mr. Miller had
pulled his car into the lane where the bus was traveling in such a manner that
the bus could not avoid striking the Mustang.
defense.

This was a critical part of their

They argued to the jury that Mr. Christiansen had pulled into the

West lane of traffic in front of the bus driven by Mr. Miller and stopped his
vehicle in such a manner that it was impossible for the bus to stop and that the
accident resulted from Mr. Christiansen pulling into the lane when there was not

r.

sufficient room to do so.

This is completely contrary to the version of the

accident originally given by Mr. Miller, and was an item that counsel for Plaintiff purposely did not elaborate on in the discovery deposition because counsel
wanted to use the two different versions of the accident to impeach Mr. Miller

-17-
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III. THE FAILURE AND REFUSAL OF THE COCRT TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR APPORTIONMENT
OF NEGLIGENCE DENIED TO PLAINTIFF HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
At the time that the Court held the hearing in chambers on th;
structions to be given the jury in the case, counsel for Plaintiff asked
Honorable Judge Taylor what his feelings were with regard to instructing
jury about the legal consequences of its apportionment of negligence in lL
of the cases of McGinn v. Utah Power & Li,;ht, 529 P.2d 423; and the disser.
opinion of Justice Maughan in Lampkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 (1979).

Judg·

Tavlor indicated at that time that until such time as the Supreme Court ir.
overn1le::i 'lcGinn v. Utah Power & Light, supra, he was going to follow its
ing and would not consider an instruction to the jury relating to the lega
consequences of its apportionment of negligence.

Plaintiff asked the Cour

consider giving such an instruction but because of the adamant position of
Court on this issue, Plaintiff did not pursue that point.

The Plaintiff d

assert, however, that the failure of the Court to instruct the jury about·
legal consequences of its negligence led to a harsh and unfair result in t
trial and thwarted the interests of justice in the present case.

The Plai:

specifically contends that in this situation where the accident arose out
a rear end collision between a bus and an automobile driven by the Plainti:
the equity is clearly in favor of the Plaintiff recovering for his injurie:
However, where the jury is kept in the dark as to the affects of its appor·
ment of the negligence, the final affect in the present case was to deny t:
Plaintiff any recovery at all.

The Plaintiff concedes the fact that in th<

case of McGinn v. Utah Power & Light, supra, this Honorable Court stated t'
it was error for the trial court to inform the jury as to the legal affect
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its apportionment of the negligence in a comparative negligence situation.
However, in recent vears, the majority of states appear to have swung to the
opposite point of view and it now appears that the weight of opinion is moviclg in favor of allowing the jury to know the legal effect of its apportionment.

See e.g., Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 579 P.2d 683 (1978); Roman v.

clitchell, 82 N.J. 336, 413 Atl.2d 332 (1980); Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo,
~.

295 Minn. 200, 203 N.W.2d 841 (1973); Porsche v. Gulf Mississippi Marine

~'

390 F.Supp. 624 (E.D. La. 1975).

This is clearly pointed out in the con-

curring and dissenting opinions in the case of Lampkin v. Lynch, supra.

In the

concurring opinion of Justices Wilkins and Steart, they clearly indicate that
in their opinion the Court should reconsider its position announced in McGinn
v. Utah Power & Light, supra, that it is prejudicial error if in a comparative
negligence case the Court instructs the jury as to the effect or impact of its
fact finding answers in a special verdict will have on the outcome of the case.
Supra at 533.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Maughan clearly stated that in
his opinion the McGinn case, supra, should be reconsidered.

The position the

Judge took at trial in this case is that although the Justice appeared to state
in Lampkin v. Lynch that when the matter is properly raised on appeal, McGinn
will be reconsidered, until such time as the Court actually reverses McGinn,
it is binding on the lower Courts.

Plaintiff urges, in fact, McGinn v. Utah

Power & Light should be reversed and that it is proper for the trial court to
inform the jury of the affects of its apportionment of negligence in a comparative negligence situation.
In the case of Seppi v. Betty, supra, the Idaho Court gives a very
,,~11

reasoned opinion on the question of informing the jury of the effect of
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its apportionment.

The Idaho Court points out that without such knowledge

jury is easily confused and injustice is likely to result.

For example, i

points to instructions given in the case which tell the jury to determine
damages proved by the evidence to have proximately resulted from the negli
of the defendants" and then asks them in the special verdict form to deter:
"the total amount of damages sustained by both plaintiffs."

579 P. 2d at 6

This is precisely how the jury was instructed in this case.

In his instru

26, Judge Taylor stated that the jury was to assess only damages proven to
been caused by Defendant's negligence and thEn in question 4 of the special
diccc aSK3 for total damages sustained by the Plaintiff.
This is precisely the situation the Idaho Court in

~.

Record, pp. 163,
supra, claims is

fusing to the jury if a consequences instruction is not given.

The~·

saning is compelling for the proposition that McGinn should be reversed.
In the Roman case, supra, the New Jersey Supreme Court states:
Plaintiffs argue that unless the jury is made aware
of the legal effect of its findings as to percentages of negligence, such findings may be premised
on an erroneous concept of the law and can result in
a molded judgment far different from that intended
by the jury. In this very case it has been suggested
that the jury may well have concluded that its findings of the infant plaintiff's negligence quota of
75% and defendant Mitchell's 25% would result in a
monetary verdict for plaintiff for 25% of the damages found.
We believe the contention has merit and that a jury
in a comparative negligence situation should be given
an ultimate outcome charge so that its deliberations
on percentages of negligence will not be had in a vacuum, or possibly based on a mistaken notion of how
the statute operates. Prior to the adoption of the
comp~rative negligence statute when the contributory
negligence of a plaintiff was an absolute bar to recover in this State, a jury was instructed as to the
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outcome of its findings, by a charge that if it found
contriQutor'1 negligence to any substantial degree, its
verdict must be for the defendant. 413 Atl.2d at 327.
They then went on to hold that reason dictates that a jury be informed of the
consequences of the apportiomnent of negligence to prevent injustice to the
parties.
The position that McGinn should be reassessed and reversed to the
extent that it precludes informing the jury of the affect of its apportiomnent,
is supported in an article in the Utah Bar Journal entitled "Utah Comparative
Negligence Practice Does Blindfolded Justice Demand Blindfolded Juries?", Utah
Bar Journal, Vol. 7, Nos. 10-12; Vol. 8, Nos. 1-6, Winter, 1979-Summer, 1980.
The author points out the fact that there are legal arguments on both sides
of the question and that while in the early days of comparative negligence,
the weight of scholarly though appeared to be on the side of keeping the juries
ignorant of the affect of their apportiomnent, the more recent trend and the
more reasoned argument seems to be more in favor of allowing the juries to know
what affect their apportiomnent will have on the damages recovered by the Plaintiff.
Ms. Barton's article cites the findings of the University of Chicago
Jury Project, Broder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 Neb.L.Rev. 744
(1959), and sets forth that the findings of the jury study indicate that when
a jury is not informed of the affect of their apportionment of the damages in
a case, notwithstanding the fact that the Court instructs them to award the
total damages, thev often, if not in a majority of the cases, reduce the amount
of damages they award as a total to reflect their apportionment of the negligence.

If one looks at the answers to the special interrogatories in this case,
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it is a lot easier to reconcile th~ meager damage award given by the juG
being a reflection of this principle, i.e., thilt the jury set forth what:
figured to be 30% of the Plaintiff's damages at the figure given rather t:
that the sum they awarded was the total amount of damages suffered by the
tiff.

This is especially true since instruction no. 26 tells the jury to

award damages caused by Defendant's negligence.

See Record, p. 163.

Leon Green, an eminent authority in the field of tort law, po:
out in an article Negligence Law, No Fault and Jurv Trial, 50 Tex. L.Rev.
1

c'; ~·; :'1at there is a disparity in the results which are probably reachec

a comparative negligence case depending on who is the fact finder.

In

t~

the fact finder is the Judge, the Judge, of course, knows the affect of t
portionment and, therefore, one is sure that a proper apportionment of the
gence and damages is made.

However, when we blindfold the jury so that t:.

do not know the affect of the apportionment of their negligence, Green st;
that denying instructions to guide the jury in the performance of its func
because of fear that it may reach a judgment based on a layman's sense of
can hardly be called jury trial.

50 Tex. L.Rev. at 1114.

While early cas

supported the idea that the jury should be kept in ignorance as to the efi
of its apportionment, the Courts and legislatures of the country appear tc
swinging now in the opposite direction.

For example, the legislatures in

State of Minnesota, Colorado, North Dakota, Wyoming and Kansas have, by la
decreed that juries reach their special verdict answers with knowledge of
applicable law.

See Barton, supra, at page 28.

Other states have reached the conclusion that the jury should
told of the affect of its apportionment bv Decree of Courts.
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See e.g.,

~mith

v. Gizzi, S64 P.2d 1009 (Okla., 1977); Seppi v. Betty, supra; Porsche v.

Gulf c!ississippi Marine Corp., supra; Roman v. Mitchell, supra; Krengal v. Mid,.,est Automatic Photo, Inc., supra; as stated by Ms. Syd Barton in the conclusion
of her article:
Adherence to McGinn by the Utah Courts results merely
in the blind leading the blind. Especially in the face
of opposing authority, a single decision resting on
cases from other states which no longer stand in their
own jurisdictions is no reason to keep our comparative
negligence jurors blindfolded. Barton, Utah Comparative Negligence Practice, supra at 35.
Therefore, the Plaintiff respectfully urges that this Court overrule the holding in XcGinn v. Utah Power & Light, supra, and based on the failure of the trial court in this case to instruct the jury on the affect of its
~pportionment

of negligence as requested by the Plaintiff-Appellant, that this

case be reversed and remanded to the District Court for a new trial.
IV. THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS A RESULT OF SYMPATHY,
BIAS, PASSION AND PREJUDICE Al'ID WAS CONTRARY TO
THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
The jury answered the special interrogatories and stated
1.

Harry Christiansen was negligent.

2.

His negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.

3.

Defendants Utah Transit Authority and John G. Miller were negli-

4.

Their negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.

gent.

and then apportioned the negligence as follows:
Christiansen 70%.
Defendants Utah Transit Authority and Miller 30%.
Record ~t 176.

They further assessed special damages at $7,700.00 and general
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Record at 177.

damages of $5,000.00.

The apportionment of negligence given by the jury and the amo'.
of damages clearly show that the jury was acting contrary to the weight oi
evidence in the case and had been confused considering the apportionment c
negligence, the affect on damages and was clearly a result of sympathy,

o:

passion and prejudice.
The factual evidence as to the collision is clear.

The Plaint

automobile stopped behind another vehicle for a red light at the intersect
of ?lOO s,;pth and 7th East.

After the Plaintiff had been stopped for a cc

of seconds, ::<e car he was driving was then struck in the rear by a Utah Tr
Authority bus driven by Defendant Miller.

For the jury to assess 70% of t

responsibility for the collision to the Plaintiff the driver of the vehi~
which was struck from behind by the bus, is clearly contrary to the evidet
in the case.
That the jury's general damage award for pain and suffering wa.
substantially less than the special damages for medical bills and lost wag.
indicates that there is a good probability that the jury acted in preciH~
the manner set out in the Chicago Jury Study set forth in the article on C:
comparative negligence practice heretofore cited.
at pp. 27-35.

Utah Bar Journal, supra

See also Broder, The University of Chicago Jurv P'oject, ~

It appears that the jury determined that the negligence was 70%-30;~ and th<
decreased the damages awarded based on those proportions and then filled i:
the answers to the questions notwithstanding the Court's instructions that
should not do that.

Thus, as stated in the article "when, despite instruC'.

to set the amount of the Plaintiff's total damages, the jury reduces the a1
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because of the Plaintiff's negligence, and the Judge, pursuant to the prescribed
procedure reduces it again, a double deduction results.''
CoIT.parative Negligence Practice, supra at p. 31.

See Barton, Utah

The Chicago Jury Project shows

that this confusing result is a common occurrence.
For the jury to assess negligence to the Plaintiff of 70%, and the
bus driver and bus company 30% is simply contrary to good sense and reason.
In Heft and Heft, Comparative Negligence Manual (1971), the authors, who are
authorities in the field of comprative negligence, set forth figures that their
research has shown to be typical apportionments in typical cases.

They state

that in the situation involving a rear end collision, the negligence should
be apportioned 100% to the rear vehicle and 0% to the front vehicle in the normal situation.

See Heft and Heft, supra, at §4.50.

In discussing this appor-

tiornnent of 100%-0%, they state
This is the ordinary case of the rear end collision.
The Defendant driver hits the Plaintiff's car, which
has been stopped at an arterial intersection for several seconds; and the oncoming Defendant is guilty of
negligent look out or unlawful speed or both. It was
heretofore indicated that not all rear end collisions
are settled or litigated on a percentage of 100%.
Obviously, in cases where the Plaintiff stops without
signal, or stops in the country or at a place where
stops are not ordinarily made, or stops abruptly, this
percentage must be modified. Ordinarily, brake lights
of the stopping car are sufficient warning. However,
there are instances when the driver of the stopping
car is aware, or should in the exercise of ordinary
care be aware, of traffic conditions to the rear which
makes stopping at that point and time negligent. Heft
and Heft, supra, at §4.50. (Emphasis added.)
In the present case, taken in the light most favorable to the Defendant, the
evidence is clear that the bus had sufficient time to stop without colliding
with the Plaintiff had the bus driver been exercising reasonable care.
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This

fact, coupled with the bus driver's statement that the brakes on the bus·,
spongy or defective, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the bulk of
blame for this particular collision must lie with the Defendant ~iller an:
bus company.

According to Heft and Heft, supra, the 100%-0% apportionmen:

negligence in a rear end case could be modified as a result of an unexpec:
stop, or a stop in a situation where one would not ordinarily expect ave·
to be stopping.

Heft and Heft notes that the brake lights of the Plainti'.

care are adequate warning of an impending stop,

l/ith brake lights admittE

on and ].'th the bus and the Mustang approaching a red traffic signal to v;
approaching Southbound at 21st South, makes it impossible for the
to argue that the stop made by the Mustang was unexpected,

Defend~

The bus drive:

deposition testimony does indicate that the stop was sudden.

However, thE

er's deposition testimony was that it was not a panic stop or a skidding;
such that it should have surprised the following bus driver.

The bus dr:

was approaching a red light, there were vehicles in front of him.

A co1IIIllC

sense interpretation is that the bus driver should have been slowing his:
and expecting the vehicles ahead of him to stop.

Clearly, for the j urv i:

present case to have assessed 70% of the fault for this particular collis'.
to the Plaintiff's vehicle, which had stopped behind another vehicle at a
light and was then struck from the rear by the bus following,

is a manife;

carriage of justice.
The cumulative effect of the other errors set forth in the in;·
ing of the jury and the failure of the Court to allow the issue of gross,
and wanton negligence to be prevented, through Plaintiff's amended Complai
coupled with other errors set forth as grounds f•n reversal in this case '
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the Plaintiff, is that the jury reached a verdict which was clearly contrary
to the evidence in the case, which resulted from passion, sympathy and prejudice.
1:

This Court should reverse the trial Court's order to prevent a manifest

miscarriage of justice.
As stated in Korleski v. Lane, 10 Wis.2d 163, 168; 102 N.W.2d 34
(1960), the appellate court has the right to grant a new trial in the situation

1:

where there has been an obvious miscarriage of justice and the apportionment

:E

of negligence is contrary to the weight of the evidence.

1t

the light most favorable to the Defendant, the facts do not warrant the appor-

rr

tionment of 70% of the negligence and causation for the collision to the Plaintiff.

JE

Here, even taken in

Clearly, the jury has created an injustice which should be corrected by

this Court through the granting to the Plaintiff of a new trial.

V. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ASSERT WILFUL
AND WANTON NEGLIGENCE DENIED PLAINTIFF A FAIR TRIAL.

r:

~

On

the 9th day of January, 1980, the Plaintiff-Appellant made a

motion to the Court to amend the Complaint to add claims against Utah Transit

i:

Aut~ority

5;

additional Defendants who were employees of the Utah Transit Authority.

i

for wilful and wanton negligence and for punitive damages and to add
This

motion was based upon admissions made by John G. Miller in his deposition to
the effect that the brakes on the bus were faulty and that he had been ordered
to take the bus onto the road with faulty brakes.

Subsequent to these declar-

ations in the deposition of John G. Miller, Plaintiff-Appellant hired a private investigator to take statements from other driver-employees of the Utah
Transit Authority and Plaintiff-Appellant obtained statements from numerous
drivers indicating that it was the management policy of the Utah Transit Authority
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and Plaintiff-Appellant obtained statements from numerous drivers indicat:
that it was the management policy of the l;tah Transit Authority to send 0,_
onto the road when it was known that the brakes on said buses were defect:
Based upon these statements and the statement of ~lr. :iiller that in the P<
cular situation involving the Plaintiff the bus which collided with Plain:
vehicle had been put onto the road with defective brakes, the

Plaintiff~
d~

a motion to the Court to add a count in the complaint seeking punitive

for wilful and wanton negligence against Utah Transit Authority and their
age~e~~

~xecutives.

The motion of the Plaintiff to amend the complaint was argued
fore the Honorable Bryant H. Croft on the 18th day of January, 1980.

Co~

for Defendant argued that the motion should not be granted because the

t~

was set and the Defendant would be prejudiced if the Plaintiff were allow<
to amend its complaint at such a late date.

The Plaintiff contended that

not feel the Defendant was prejudiced; that if, in fact, the Defendant was
udiced, the trial date could be stricken and reset at a later date

grant~

the Defendant the time it needed to prepare for the claims in the new cofil
and further, that the Plaintiff had a right to have all his claims present
to the Court and the jury in the above-entitled case.

The Plaintiff cla~

he had a right to have a determination by the jury on the merits as to th<
tion of the gross, wilful and wanton negligence of Utah Transit Authority
its employees and agents and the question of punitive damages could only'.
claimed against the Defendant Utah Transit Authority upon a showing by the
tiff that the Utah Transit Authority acted with malice.

The Plaintiff

that point of view and further asserted that the .1, 1e 3 tion of wilful and
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cor.
wi

negligence related to the apportionment of negligence and that the negligence
of the Plaintiff would be no defense in a situation involving gross, wilful
and wanton negligence of the Utah Transit Authority in sending the buses onto
the roads when it knew they had bad brakes.

The Court, after hearing arguments

of counsel, denied the Plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint and signed
an order denying said motion on the 23rd day of January, 1980.
The Plaintiff contends that the District Court erred in failing
to allow to Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his Complaint to set forth claims
of gross, wilful and wanton negligence and to make claims for punitive damages
based on the facts discovered by the Plaintiff's relating to the sending of
buses onto the road by Utah Transit Authority with bad brakes.

It cannot be

argued by the Defendants that they would have in any way been prejudiced by allowing the amendment or that such prejudice should have been the basis for denying the motion.

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska treated this problem

in the case of Wright v. Vickaryous, 598 P.2d 490 (Alaska, 1979).
case,

~·

In the Wright

the Alaska Supreme Court properly concluded that if an amendment

to the pleading is sought by the Plaintiff and this amendment presents a new
theory, the proper remedy for a claimed lack of time to prepare for trial is
a continuance to be granted to the Defendant and not to prevent trial on the
merits on the new theory.

See also, Booth v. Red Eagle Oil Co., 393 P.2d 871

(Okla., 1964).
The failure of the Court to allow the Plaintiff to amend the Complaint precluded the Plaintiff at trial from bringing in testimony of other
bus drivers to show that in fact the bus company had a policy of sending buses
"'ith L1ult:1 brakes onto the roads and that the primary cause of the collision
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was the fact that the bus companv had sent a hus onto the road with fault
As stated by Mr. }tiller in the statement given to the bus companv on the
of the collision (Record at pp. 48-49). at the time he gave the initials
ment, his sole claim for the cause of the accident was the faulty brakes
bus because as he stated
If brakes had been 100%, I would have been able
to stop. My foot was clear to the floor for a
full 25 feet. Record at p. 48.
~r.

~iller

further stated
Brakes very spongy and bus had received a road
call earlier in the day. Record at p. 49.

The fact that Mr. Miller stated that the bus company sent the ':>us into sE·
knowing that there were bad brakes, and the evidence of the statements

o:

employees obtained by Plaintiff's private investigator that this '-"aS a cc:
practice of the Utah Transit Authority, was sufficient evidence to go bei
the jury on the question of wilful and wanton negligence.

In the event:

the jury had believed that there was wilful and wanton negligence on ber.o
of the Utah Transit Authority, then the negligence of the Plaintiff
have been no defense to Plaintiff's claims for injuries.

here~·

It is the conte-

of the Plaintiff herein that the approach taken bv the Alaska Supreme

C~

Wright v. Vickaryous, supra, is proper and that i:-istead of denying the me
of the Plaintiff to amend, the Court should have allowed the Plaintiff t:
the Complaint and granted a continuance to allow the Defendant whatever s
tional time it needed to prepare to defend the new allegations set forth
the Plaintiff in an amended Complaint.

The Cai lure of the District Cour:

allow Plaintiff to amend his Complaint ·.1as prejuclicial, and this Court;·
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c

remand the case f,Jr a new trial and allow the Plaintiff to amend his Complaint
to set forth claims for '«ilful and wanton negligence and punitive damages ag'!inst Ut;ih Transit Authority and its supervisory employees.
CONCLUSION
.IBEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully

1

submits that the errors of the Court below in refusing to allow amendment of
the Complaint and the errors at trial in misinstructing the jury and refusing
to inform the jurv of the legal consequences of their apportionment of negligence resulted in a manifest injustice to Plaintiff and this Honorable Court
should reverse the verdict of the jury and remand the case for a new trial and
allow Plaintiff to amend the Complaint.
Respectfully submitted this

'l
/

day of February, 1981.

"Edward T. Wells
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
1220 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

At ?/ / s?t7z'l
l

Lh---.__

David K. Robinson
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
1220 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I handed to TRS Runner Service the orig

of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to be delivered to the Court, State c

Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, and two copies of the same to be delivere

the Attorney for Respondents, Timothy R. Hanson, 175 South West Temple, 5
I

Lake City, Utah, on the

-~

day of February, 1981.
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